This issue paper outlines recommendations for dealing with the issues relating to the criteria that were not resolved at INC3 (held at Geneva in September 1999). It aims to highlight only the residual main concerns of WWF with regard to the identification of additional substances for inclusion under the Treaty.

1. The information required at the screening stage should not be made so onerous such that developing countries, and countries with economies in transition, are deterred from proposing chemicals for consideration as future UNEP POPs.
2. There is a need to take into account the precautionary principle when evaluating whether a proposed substance should be considered to be a UNEP POP.
3. In assessing bioaccumulation, a log K_ow of 4 should be chosen as the screening criteria in preference to a log K_ow of 5; in assessing persistence, a half-life of greater than 2 months in water should be used as the criteria rather than water half-life of greater than 6 months.
4. The decision making process should be transparent, and data on which decisions are made should be publicly available.
5. Lack of data on a substance should not be permitted to hold up the process for an unacceptable time.

In order that the Treaty can be a tool used by all countries (including developing countries and countries with economies in transition) it is essential that the initial data requirements to determine if a proposed substance meets the initial criteria are not made too onerous. For example, at this initial stage, there should be no need for a criteria statement detailing the reasons for concern, including, where possible, a comparison of toxicity data with the levels of a substance resulting from long range transport. If the substance meets the other criteria relating to persistence, bioaccumulation, and potential for long range transport, this should be considered adequate reason for concern. Therefore, in Annex D, the whole of 1bis (f) should be deleted.

Utilizing the Precautionary Principle

When considering proposals to list additional substances, it is important that the precautionary principle is taken into account at two main stages in the process. First, when determining whether a proposed substance fulfils the screening criteria, and second, when evaluating whether, on the basis of the risk profile, the proposal should proceed.

Taking precautionary action on POPs before there is full scientific certainty is undoubtedly justified under the Rio definition because, due to the very persistent nature of POPs, "there are threats of serious or irreversible damage." There is certainly a need to try to take precautionary action to prevent damage before it occurs, and not wait for full scientific certainty about the levels that are likely to cause effects. Indeed, scientific certainty about the levels that are likely to cause effects in remote areas is likely to remain illusive. There is great lack of knowledge about the interactive (and possibly additive) effects of concurrent exposure to low levels of many substances. Also, it is difficult to predict the long-term toxicity to higher predators, or other wildlife species, from just a few tests on a limited number of species. Therefore, the precautionary principle should feature in Article F3 and F5, or at some position in the Treaty where it clearly applies to these decisions.

It is vital that the specific criteria are able to embrace all chemicals that will generate future global concern. Therefore, where there is a dispute over a particular value, the more inclusive should be chosen. Thus, a substance should meet the criteria for persistence or bioaccumulation if its half life in water is greater than 2 months or if its log K_ow is greater than 4.

When screening for persistence, the half life in water of 2 months should be chosen rather than the 6 month value because, like air, water is a transport medium. The values chosen for these media should be equitable, and as water in the upper layers travels at around 1/33^rd of the wind speed, a half life of 60 days in water compares well with the half life of 2 days in air. The UN ECE POP protocol has chosen a half-life in water of greater than 2 months as a criterion. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that chemicals are liable to persist much longer in colder countries, and when bound to particles.

A bioaccumulation screening value of log K_ow of 4 should be chosen in preference to a log K_ow of 5, as some compounds with log K_ow values measured at less than 5 have been found to be able to bioaccumulate to quite significant levels. Lindane, for example, has a log K_ow in the range 3.2-3-7, and yet field measurements in bream suggest a BCF of 10,000-50,000 and a BCF of 26,198 was found in one study on the common mussel. Similarly, organotin compounds have log K_ow values of 3.3-3.6 and yet have BCFs of over 5000.

It should also be remembered that a measured bioconcentration factor (BCF) or bioaccumulation factor (BAF) will always be used rather than log K_ow values, and must anyway be provided at the risk profile stage. Therefore, using a log K_ow value of 4 in the screening criteria will serve to encourage industry to determine more accurately the ability of their substances to bioaccumulate in biota. It will not lead to compounds that should not be regulated under the Treaty going forward to become UNEP POPs.

WWF considers that before the POPs Review Committee set aside a proposal to list a substance because the screening criteria have not been fulfilled, it should inform both Parties and observers. The data that the POPs Review Committee considered should also be publicly available, as should a brief summary of their conclusions with respect to each of the criteria. This would enable other Parties and observers to provide further relevant data to support a proposal. Therefore, in Article F3 the square brackets on "observers" and "before" should be removed.

There is a need for full transparency of the decision making process, and therefore a summary of the reasons for decision taken, or recommendations made by the POPs Review Committee, and all written documentation supporting these, should be made available to Parties, observers, and the public.

When a proposal to list a new substance under the Treaty is being considered, it may be that there is an acknowledged need for further information. However, it is important that such further data on a substance is provided in a timely manner. Therefore, there is a need to ensure that after an appropriate period of time, lack of data will be dealt with by using the worst case scenario.

This issue paper offers recommendations for addressing DDT within the framework of the global POPs Treaty. DDT's proven hazards to health and the environment make it a prime candidate for phase out, although elimination of its use for controlling malaria and other diseases remains a challenge. The phase out will need to address carefully the needs of the roughly two dozen countries that still use DDT for malaria control.

Already there has been considerable movement away from reliance on DDT for controlling malaria. Indeed, the Pan American Health Association (PAHO) stated in its 1998 report, Health in the Americas, that "the major public health perception that malaria control is achieved through insecticide spraying and that this can only be done by a major operational institution must change." PAHO reiterated this view in its 1999 Report on the Status of Malaria Programs in the Americas.

Several countries in the Asia/Pacific region have successfully moved away from DDT. For example, the World Health Organization's (WHO) Roll Back Malaria campaign reports that in Vietnam between 1990 and 1997, deaths from malaria dropped 98 percent--from 4,500 to 100. This was accomplished using drugs and chemically treated bed nets. At INC3, delegates from the Philippines and Thailand noted their countries' great success with alternative approaches.

DDT was used in only a few locations in Africa during the great eradication campaigns of 30-50 years ago, owing to uncertainty about its effectiveness in high transmission areas and about the capacity of the public health infrastructure to implement the spraying program. Today, an estimated nine African nations are using DDT.

Malaria is increasing in many countries. It might be tempting to attribute this increase to reduced use of DDT. But the reality is more complex. In some countries, mosquitoes developed resistance to DDT. In others, civil unrest and severe rains have impeded delivery of malaria control services. In still others, migration into frontier areas lacking adequate shelter has caused malaria to increase. In many instances, severely strained malaria control budgets have limited governments' ability to respond.

The major non-DDT approaches to controlling malaria that have been used successfully include other chemical sprays, drugs, chemically-treated bed nets, and non-chemical methods for eliminating the mosquitoes that transmit malaria. However, substantial concern exists, especially among malaria control specialists and those relatively few countries still using DDT, that these alternatives are not sufficiently effective, sustainable, or affordable.

Amidst uncertainties about the adequacy of alternatives and the availability of the financial and technical assistance necessary to effect a transition away from DDT in developing nations, the provisions of the POPs Treaty pertaining to DDT must be drafted with great care. Negotiators must ensure that human health is not compromised as reliance on DDT is reduced. To accomplish this, the Treaty must stimulate the essential flow of financial and technical support to increase national capacity for implementing measures to reduce reliance on DDT.

The POPs Treaty should:

1. Facilitate reduced production and use of DDT as much as possible without compromise to human health, with the ultimate objective of complete elimination.
2. Provide financial and technical assistance for the development and implementation of National Implementation Plans (NIPs) required by the Treaty, so that the burden of a DDT phase-out does not fall unfairly on developing nations.
3. Allow country-focused "specific exemptions" to the Annex A "elimination" of DDT production and use.
4. Require routine review of the availability, affordability, sustainability, and effectiveness of alternatives to DDT for disease control, as well as the availability of resources to implement them.
5. Track production and use of DDT and link/limit production to disease control needs.

Within Annex A, periodic reviews and other provisions can address the technical and financial uncertainties associated with DDT and its alternatives. The Treaty could specify a target date for elimination, subject to possible extension as part of periodic reviews. Regardless of whether a particular target date is established, the Treaty should provide for routine assessment of alternatives to DDT and funding for them. In this context, future DDT production should be limited for sale/use only by those countries receiving specific exemptions under the Treaty.

Currently, there are only three known producers of DDT (Mexico, India, and China). Both production and use have been dropping. For example, Mexico is well on its way to meeting its goal of an 80 percent reduction in DDT use by 2001, as compared to 1996. With assistance from the World Bank, India is working to reduce its reliance on DDT as well. The POPs Treaty should accelerate this process globally.

Ensure Increased Malaria Control Funding

National malaria control programs in many countries have suffered from severe underfunding, and there has been a gross shortfall in international spending for malaria research and field programs. There are, however, some promising signs of increased international concern and investments. These include the Roll Back Malaria Initiative (organized by WHO in partnership with other entities), the New Medicines for Malaria Venture (a partnership of WHO, the World Bank, pharmaceutical companies and others), and an investment of $50 million for vaccine development by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. But these initiatives remain modest relative to the need.

Any language in the Treaty on eliminating DDT will be more rhetorical than real in the absence of increased spending. To expedite funding for DDT reduction, countries should make specially earmarked donations immediately to the Roll Back Malaria campaign or other programs which can support national planning. Within the financial assistance framework of the Treaty itself, a special fund for malaria control could be created, with early commitments of funds dedicated to DDT elimination. Because malaria exacts such a wrenching social and economic toll in the developing world, such disease-fighting initiatives will contribute to the development needs of the billion or so people who live under the threat of malaria. It could be considered a critical form of economic development assistance.

Allow Specific Exemptions

Placement of DDT within Article D's Annex A, which focuses on elimination, is the preferred way forward, while using "specific exemption" designations to address countries' special needs. WWF anticipates that those countries that currently produce or use DDT for public health purposes will stipulate such specific exemptions and that those stipulations would take effect once the treaty enters into force. Those stipulations need to be considered in the context of NIPs (Article E) and technical and financial assistance measures (Articles J/K).

For a country stipulating a DDT-related specific exemption, its NIP would need to include measures that facilitate, over time, reduced DDT production/use without compromising human health. Such plans would need to be consistent with pertinent WHO guidance on disease management, including measures to prevent diversion from the public health sector to the agriculture sector. The ability of many developing countries and countries with economies in transition to develop and implement NIPs or WHO guidance will be conditioned on the availability of financial and technical assistance. Such assistance, along with more effective use of in-country resources, will play a critical role in meeting the challenge of eliminating DDT and protecting public health.

Require Systematic Reviews of Alternatives

DDT was remarkably successful in reducing malaria in many locations during the eradication campaigns of 30-50 years ago. But eradication was not achieved globally and since then WHO has shifted from eradication to malaria control. There have been successes in many places with DDT alternatives for controlling malaria. But no single method has proven universally successful. Mosquitoes develop resistance to chemicals; the malaria parasite develops resistance to drugs; breeding habitat cannot always be managed; and bed net programs can encounter substantial obstacles in implementation. PAHO, while highly critical of spraying programs, has also noted problems with alternatives. Periodic review under the Treaty will help promote the availability of effective, affordable, sustainable methods. These reviews should occur no less often than every three years following entry into force of the Treaty, and should be linked to NIPs.

This issue paper was prepared in collaboration with Physicians for Social Responsibility and Pesticide Action Network.

While the use of many of the pesticides targeted in the POPs Treaty has been greatly reduced or even banned in some parts of the world, the destruction of existing stocks of these chemicals poses yet another difficult dilemma. This issue paper outlines the problem of the accumulation of vast stockpiles of obsolete pesticides – a peril that exists in every region of the world.

In Africa, a conservative estimate by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) puts the total quantity of obsolete pesticides at about 20,000 metric tons. In Asia and Latin America, where less data has been gathered, perhaps another 80,000 metric tons are held, and in the Commonwealth of Independent States early estimates indicate stockpiles of at least 150,000 metric tons.

Many of these pesticides were produced up to 40 years ago, during a period when many common mass-produced insecticides were POPs. The fate of these organochlorine chemicals is the subject of the current POPs negotiations.

1. Disposal of POPs stockpiles should utilize the safest and most environmentally sound methods available, with careful attention to worker protection and to the prevention of harmful by-products.
2. Efforts to identify and inventory existing stocks and to ensure their safe pre-disposal storage and transport should be expedited.
3. Financial and technical assistance should be available for inventory and disposal efforts.
4. Research to develop new and safer methods for destroying obsolete stockpiles is critical and should be expanded.

Several factors have contributed to the accumulation of pesticide stockpiles. Centralized supply systems often did not take into account actual need; pesticides were over-ordered and over-supplied. In many cases, pest management strategies for migratory pests such as desert locust required large stocks of pesticides to be amassed for pest outbreaks that never came. This strategy contributed, for example, to the accumulation of 3000 metric tons of now obsolete pesticides in Morocco, and 882 metric tons in Tunisia. In other cases, well-intentioned donor agencies supplied pesticides of the wrong type, in the wrong place, or in inappropriate packaging or formulations, such as 86,000 liters of carbaryl supplied to Senegal in a formulation which corroded the aerial application equipment in use.

It was not only misguided good intentions, however, that led to this type of accumulation. There were and there continue to be many cases of unscrupulous behavior such as dumping of obsolete chemicals, intentional oversupply to boost sales, and provision of products with labels in foreign languages or with no labels at all. One example involves of 200 metric tons of DDT and unidentified pesticides sent from Greece to Tanzania where they now decay while awaiting international funding for a disposal operation more than a decade later.

In developing countries chemicals are often stored in unsuitable conditions and rapidly lose their effectiveness as pest control agents. Modern pesticides have a shelf life of about two years when properly stored. But certain components in pesticide formulations deteriorate more quickly if exposed to extreme heat or cold, or if their containers are damaged and thus expose the chemicals to air. Such a situation exists at the Middle Awash State Farm in Ethiopia where 36 metric tons of pesticides stored in the open on a flood plain are now unusable and are leaking into the ground.

The combined result of these multiple failings in pesticide supply and management has been the accrual of huge quantities of obsolete pesticides. In many cases these chemicals are escaping into the environment, contaminating soil, water, and air, and threatening wildlife and human health. Elsewhere it is only a matter of time before the pesticides corrode their drums or before paper sacks of DDT, lindane, chlordane, and other pesticide powders are punctured.

Solving the existing problem of obsolete pesticide stockpiles is both technically challenging and expensive. The location of the stocks in some of the poorest regions of the world adds to the complexity and cost.

The most commonly used methods for the disposal of hazardous chemical waste are incineration, chemical processing, or landfill. Unfortunately, virtually none of these existing technologies is able to eliminate the harmful materials without generating potentially dangerous by-products. Incineration of POP pesticides leads to the formation of dioxins and furans, which are, themselves, extremely hazardous POP chemicals. Chemical treatment generally produces a larger volume of less hazardous chemicals, which then require further treatment and disposal. Landfill, no matter how carefully engineered, is never a permanent solution, since seals and linings eventually degrade releasing the contained waste into the environment.

Several new technologies, such as gas-phase hydrogenation, electrochemical oxidation, plasma arc, and molten metal, offer different ways of dealing with chemical waste. These systems tend to be highly specific with regard to the chemicals they can decompose, however, and often the process is slow or extremely costly. Obsolete pesticide stockpiles generally consist of mixed chemicals, frequently contaminated by additional, unidentified substances. Many countries holding stocks of obsolete pesticides lack the infrastructure necessary to support resource intensive technologies such as high temperature waste incinerators or advanced chemical processing plants.

At present, developing countries and transitional economies seeking to dispose of hazardous materials have limited options. Some have buried their old chemical stocks, but this accelerates the corrosion of containers and release of the chemicals -- in some cases into ground water. Such burial has taken place in many countries; an example of the potentially disastrous consequences of this practice comes from Yemen. In the absence of better disposal options, 30 metric tons of unwanted pesticides were buried in their containers in the early 1980s at the Surdod State Farm in the Tehama Region of Western Yemen, an irrigated site which sits on a seasonal flood plain. A recent survey of the burial site revealed that more than 1,400 metric tons of soil are now heavily contaminated with unidentified pesticides, which have leaked from their containers and are contaminating ground water.

Elsewhere the incineration of obsolete pesticides and other hazardous wastes has been seen as a cheap solution to this difficult problem. Cement kilns, iron smelters, and open fires are used for destroying waste locally. Such facilities, which have succeeded in diminishing tons of these dangerous stocks, unfortunately contribute to serious environmental contamination and associated health hazards, through the release of both the waste chemicals and their toxic by-products.

Since 1994 the FAO has been working with developing countries to quantify and dispose of accumulated obsolete pesticide stocks. This is a costly and complex task. In six years about 3,000 metric tons of obsolete pesticides have been disposed of from 14 African countries at a cost of almost US$14 million. This averages out to almost US$5000 per metric ton. Of these 14 countries, only two are now clear of all obsolete pesticides. The other 12, along with every other African country, still have obsolete stocks which require expensive disposal. Work has just begun to identify and quantify stocks in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.

UNEP is initiating similar efforts to address POPs stockpiles, as part of a Global Environmental Facility (GEF) project entitled "Assessing National Management Needs of Persistent Toxic Substances." The full project, once funded, will undertake several national case studies in developing countries and countries in economic transition. It will involve evaluations of national sources and imports of POPs and other chemicals, and an identification of stockpiles and /or contaminated environmental sites requiring interventions to obviate risks to human health and the environment.

Much of the disposal of obsolete pesticides and POPs from developing countries thus far has entailed the repackaging and shipment of the waste to Europe for destruction in dedicated high temperature incinerators. This practice also presents significant hazards, both in the shipment of toxic materials over long distances and in the harmful emissions from incinerators in Europe.

Throughout the world vast stockpiles of obsolete POPs pesticides threaten local and global environments and people. The removal of this toxic legacy will require a massive international dedication of financial and technical resources from both the public and private sectors. Substantial resources must be targeted at the development of safe, effective, and affordable technologies for eliminating POPs. Developing countries and transitional economies require assistance in dealing with their POPs appropriately. Without this international effort, POPs stockpiles threaten to contaminate food, air, and water -- not only in their immediate vicinity but around the globe.

The final two Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) meetings, in Bonn, Germany (20-25 March 2000) and in Durban, South Africa (late 2000) – referred to as INC4 and INC5, respectively – are critical to international efforts to agree to a meaningful global Treaty on persistent organic pollutants (POPs). For this reason, Government negotiators have a special responsibility to ensure that the negotiations stay on the right track, and that their efforts result in a final agreement of which the global community can be truly proud.

Decisions reached by the treaty negotiators at INC4 and INC5 will determine whether or not the final agreement is an effective instrument that facilitates (or hinders) action by governments, the private sector, NGOs, and others to phase out and ban the production, trade, and use of POPs, and to promote the shift to safe and affordable alternatives.

If the remaining issues are properly resolved by the end of INC5, a strong, positive message will result. That message will alert decision makers around the world that the POPs Treaty negotiators and many others are committed to ending the legacy of hand-me-down POPs poisons. Such a message will let others know that the dangers associated with POPs must be heeded, and that the necessary changes to safeguard people, wildlife, and the natural world must be made expeditiously.

For the global POPs Treaty to be effective, Government negotiators need to make the right decisions on a few core issues. Clearly there are other important concerns, but in WWF’s view, if the five matters addressed below are dealt with properly, the new global POPs Treaty has a far greater likelihood of making a real difference:

1. Elimination: Negotiators need to remain firm and committed to making elimination the central objective of the POPs Treaty. Such a goal is central to the Treaty’s success. Language that commits to only interim steps towards elimination – such as controlling releases or reducing emissions – will not be adequate. Decades of experience have demonstrated unequivocally that there is no way to regulate and manage the continued production and use of POPs.

The promotion of clean production processes, pollution prevention, and the substitution of POPs chemicals with benign or less harmful alternatives need to be highlighted and explicitly addressed in key operative sections of the Treaty. Those sections include the Preamble (Article A), Objectives (Article B), Control Measures (Article D – including placement of all intentionally produced and unwanted byproduct/dioxin-type POPs in Annex A, with "specific exemptions," where merited, focused as narrowly as possible), National Implementation Plans (Article E), Criteria for Adding New POPs (Article F), Technical and Financial Assistance (Articles J & K), as well as other articles and annexes. All need to embrace the goal of POPs elimination.

2. Precautionary Principle: Along with elimination, the Precautionary Principle is essential in dealing with POPs-type substances and needs to be treated as a core element of the Treaty, incorporated in the Preamble (Article A) and Objectives (Article B), and reflected in the actions called for throughout operative sections of the Treaty as noted in point 1, above.

In the context of chemicals, this principle responds to the complexity of environmental health problems, the paucity of information and subsequent uncertainty about cause-effect relations, and the slow pace of government decision making. At its core, the principle calls for preventive, anticipatory measures to be taken when an activity raises threats of harm to the environment, wildlife, or human health, even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.

3. Financial and Technical Assistance: Articles J and K must provide the framework for ensuring that existing, new, and innovative sources and mechanisms are put in place to assist developing countries and economies in transition to shift more quickly, and in a just and equitable way, to alternatives to POPs. Those alternatives include safer and more sustainable products, manufacturing and disposal processes, and pest management practices.

Developing countries are on the receiving end of the most severe and widespread contamination and harm that has resulted from POPs, and that will continue to result unless effective measures are taken. Without assurances of adequate assistance from donor/industrialized countries, multilateral development banks, the private sector, and others, those countries will be unable to implement the Treaty effectively and adequately.

Clearly, it will be critical to ensure that mechanisms are in place to facilitate and encourage the flow of sufficient resources. Selecting and implementing the most effective financial mechanism/s will be an ongoing process that engages negotiators at INC4 and INC5, at the diplomatic signing ceremony in May 2001, at interim INCs thereafter, and ultimately by the Conference of Parties once the Treaty is in force. As that process moves forward, it is essential that any mechanism adequately provide for, inter alia:

• Equitable governance;
• Streamlined and efficient project cycle;
• Full public participation;
• The choice of implementing agencies based on their comparative advantage; and
• Built-in flexibility to respond to changing Treaty requirements.

1. Criteria for Adding New POPs: Article F lays down the process for adding further substances to the Treaty. Linked to that article, Annex D sets out the initial criteria which must be met for a substance to undergo a more in-depth appraisal and the development of a risk profile as detailed in Annex E. In order for the Treaty to be a tool used by all countries (including developing countries and those with economies in transition) it is essential that the initial data requirements to determine if a proposed substance meets the criteria not be too onerous. For example, at that preliminary stage there should be no requirement to compare toxicity or ecotoxicty data with predicted levels in far away locations.

To increase the likelihood that the Treaty is a forceful mechanism for preventing damage, the precautionary principle must apply to both the application of the criteria, and the evaluation of the risk profile. Where there is a dispute over a particular value, the more inclusive one should be chosen. Thus, a substance should meet the criteria for persistence or bioaccumulation if its half life in water is greater than 2 months or if its log K_ow is greater than 4 (with that lower K_ow serving to encourage industry to determine the actual accumulation of their substance in biota).

2. WTO/Trade Measures: Any trade in banned POPs substances, should be prohibited, except perhaps for purposes of their destruction where it can be accomplished without harm to human health or the environment. Governments need to ensure that if production or use of a POPs substance is prohibited, then any import or export of that substance will be prohibited as well. Consistent with this view, the inclusion of an Article Nbis type text in the Treaty is completely unacceptable, and it should be deleted. Likewise, the current brackets should be removed in the following places: around "import" and "export" in Article D1; around Article D1bis; and around "production" in D2. More generally, special care should be taken to ensure that neither the Objectives (Article B) or the Preamble (Article A) contains wording that seeks to protect trade rights at the expense of POPs Treaty obligations.

The above five issues, if addressed in the manner proposed, would greatly facilitate efforts by Government negotiators to achieve an effective global POPs Treaty. Other operational treaty provisions also need to be resolved in a responsible, effective manner, including those that address:

• wastes/stockpiles (Article D (4) and (5));
• national implementation plans/NIPs (Article E);
• information exchange (Article G);
• research, development, monitoring (Article I);
• reporting (Article L);
• non-compliance (Article M);
• settlement of disputes (Article N); and
• general exemptions (Article Zbis).

WWF stands ready to assist Governments as they prepare for INC4, the most critical round of the negotiations to date. As is often said, POPs are a global problem that demand a global solution. With leadership and political will, the opportunity exists to create a POPs Treaty that provides the framework for effectively addressing the unique dangers posed by POPs.